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Abstract
We provide an explicit characterization of aggregation in the neoclassical growth
model with aggregate shocks and uninsurable employment risk. We show that there
are two restrictions on the employment shock process that must be satisfied in order
for approximate aggregation to hold. First, the probability of unemployment must
be positive for each agent every period. This ensures a strong precautionary savings
motive. Second, like agents must have similar future prospects. That is, agents with
similar employment shocks and wealth distributions cannot have drastically different
employment paths. The model solution requires the distribution of wealth as a relevant
state variable, and hence the curse of dimensionality must be confronted. We sidestep
this thorny issue by introducing a Walrasian auctioneer that communicates the optimal
amount of aggregate capital in each period for every shock to the agents.
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1 Introduction
The one-sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks has become
a workhorse in macroeconomics. Early versions of the model were used to examine the role
of incomplete insurance on the permanent income hypothesis, monetary and fiscal policy,
the cost of business cycles, asset pricing, etc. [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. These papers spawned a vast
literature which has demonstrated the importance of the incomplete markets assumption,
and led to the popularity of this model as an important research tool.
Despite the popularity, few analytical results have been established with respect to the
model’s properties. Perhaps the best example of this pertains to aggregation. The key
message of ? (KS, hereafter) is that the neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic risk
and aggregate shocks features “approximate aggregation.” Using a numerical approach that
is now well known, KS show that most agents can self-insure through the accumulation of
capital. These agents have nearly affine policy functions in the state variables, which permits
the aggregation of ??. In equilibrium, there exists a small fraction of agents who are close
to their borrowing constraints, but their overall contribution to the aggregate capital stock
is so small that it is nearly negligible; hence approximate aggregation attains. While this
aggregation result is a robust numerical finding, a formal treatment is missing. This paper
serves to fill this void.
Our model is that of KS with a finite number of agents and time periods. The primary
challenge in solving this model is that the future price of capital depends upon the asset
holdings and employment status of each agent. Therefore, the distribution of wealth is a
relevant state variable. As the number of agents increases, the curse of dimensionality takes
hold and the problem becomes untenable.
In order to circumvent this issue, we introduce a Walrasian auctioneer who sets the level
of aggregate capital in advance for all time periods and all outcomes of the shocks. This
sequence is then communicated to the agents. Armed with this knowledge, agents are free to
make investment-consumption allocations without having to know the distribution of wealth.
We show that the typical agent’s problem has a unique solution, but we do not take up the
challenge of solving the Walrasian auctioneer’s problem in this paper. We therefore can
make no claims about the existence or uniqueness of our equilibrium. However, this setup
does allow us to provide a complete characterization of aggregation.
Our main theorem delivers conditions under which the model of KS approximately aggre-
gates. We show that there are two important restrictions on the employment shock necessary
to achieve aggregation. First, in every period, the probability of unemployment must be pos-
itive. Capital must serve the dual role of being a store of wealth, facilitating intertemporal
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substitution of consumption, and providing insurance against employment shocks. Precau-
tionary savings must be sufficiently high in order for the latter condition to be met effectively.
The risk of unemployment each period ensures that this is the case. Second, agents of a sim-
ilar background must have similar future prospects. Agents with nearly identical wealth
profiles but very different employment prospects will not have similar consumption profiles.
We place a bound on the extent to which agents’ employment paths are dissimilar. These
restrictions are the only ones imposed on the employment shocks. Thus, our results nest
those of KS.
2 The Environment
2.1 Time Time is discrete and finite, consisting of T periods and indexed by t. We will
use the convention that a new date commences with the arrival of new information. Any
variable known or chosen at date t will be indexed by t.
2.2 Firms Factor and product markets are perfectly competitive. The aggregate pro-
duction technology is Cobb-Douglas, Yt = F (Kt−1, Lt) = ztK
α
t−1L
1−α
t , with α ∈ [0, 1] and
aggregate productivity shock, zt. Profit maximization delivers the rental rate of capital and
the wage rate as
Rt = αzt
(
Kt−1
Lt
)α−1
(1)
wt = (1− α)zt
(
Kt−1
Lt
)α
(2)
2.3 Households There are N households indexed by j that live for T periods. Each
household values consumption according to
U(c1, ..., cT ) = E0
T∑
t=1
βt−1u(ct) (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. We assume that the instantaneous utility function
takes the form of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) u(ct) = (c
1−σ
t − 1)/(1− σ), where
it is understood that u(ct) = log ct for σ = 1.
Agents are endowed with one unit of time each period and do not value leisure. The
household’s units of labor supplied to the market in period t, ξt, will be stochastic and lie on
the unit interval to allow for unemployment, full employment and under-employment. Let
the random variable ej,t ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of the wage bill that belongs to household
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j at time t. The possible values of ej,t and the probabilities that they occur constitute the
employment shock. These employment shocks will have a few restrictions but will otherwise
be general enough to nest the standard assumptions found in the literature [e.g., KS]. For
now, it is enough to know that ej,t will be allowed to depend on both previous aggregate
states zt′ and employment states ej,t′, t
′ ≤ t.
Households have access to an asset, at, with rate of return on time-t holdings of rt. The
flow budget constraint for household j can be written as cj,t = wtLtej,t+ (1+ rt)aj,t−1− aj,t,
where aj,t is the t-period asset holding for household j that yields return rt+1. We assume
that the agents cannot borrow and therefore restrict asset holdings to be strictly positive.
That is, we impose the natural borrowing limit. Market clearing will impose at = kt and we
can rewrite the budget constraint as
cj,t = wtLtej,t + (1 +Rt − δ)kj,t−1 − kj,t (4)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation of capital, and the household’s return on asset
holdings is rt = Rt − δ.
2.4 The Market Arrangement In order to make their decisions rationally, the in-
dividual agents must account for the choices of their peers. This is important because the
aggregate capital stock determines the price paid for capital, and hence the return on invest-
ment. The aggregate capital stock will be a function of the wealth of each agent. A fully
rational approach would have each agent tracking the distribution of wealth over time, as a
relevant aggregate state variable. If N is “big”, the curse of dimensionality takes hold and
this becomes untenable.
Instead, we introduce a Walrasian auctioneer (henceforth, the auctioneer) to mediate
between the agents. She is the only one who needs or uses knowledge of the distribution of
wealth. Her job is to set the aggregate levels of the capital stock Kt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T in advance
for all time periods and all outcomes of the shocks. The auctioneer announces her choices to
each of the agents. They accept her forecasts as gospel. This is the extent of their bounded
rationality.
There is only one restriction on how the auctioneer may set her forecasts. They must
invariably come true. That is, for any t and any outcome of preceding shocks, it must be
the case that Kt =
∑N
j=1 kj,t,. Here the individual investments on the right are the solutions
to the agents’ problems and the aggregate investment on the left is the auctioneer’s forecast.
We refer to the problem of ensuring that these equations hold as the auctioneer’s problem.
The set of equations is determined: there is one unknown aggregate and one equation for
each non-terminal node in the tree of outcomes for the shocks. This is in the spirit of a
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general equilibrium. Each node, even though it may not be realized, plays the role of a
good. The auctioneer must set the price so that demand matches supply. A solution of the
auctioneer’s problem vindicates the agents’ bounded rationality. They were right to believe.
Each agent optimizes the expected discounted utility of his consumption taking aggregate
capital as given. We refer to this as the agent’s problem. The agent’s problem has a unique
solution which is entirely determined by the agent’s initial endowment together with the
auctioneer’s forecast.
One way of thinking of the interaction between the agent’s problem and the auctioneer’s
problem is the following: one can consider a recursion in which the auctioneer fixes aggre-
gates Kt for all possible time periods and all possible outcomes of preceeding shocks. The
households then solve the agent’s problem, optimizing expected discounted utility, taking the
auctioneer’s forecasts as given. Each household j thereby finds a unique solution consisting
of random variables {kj,t, cj,t}, which corresponds to its desired level of investment and cor-
responding consumption in period t for each outcome of the shocks. The auctioneer thereby
obtains a listing of desired aggregates by adding together the values of kj,t across house-
holds. If the desired aggregates are equal to the originally fixed aggregates, the auctioneer
has solved her problem. Otherwise, she will adjust her forecast and try again.
2.5 Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is an allocation
{(kj,t, cj,t)j∈[1,N ], Kt, Lt}
T
t=1 (5)
and a price path
{Rt, wt}
T
t=1 (6)
such that
1. Given {Rt, wt, Kt}
T
t=1, the sequence {(kj,t, cj,t)}
T
t=1 maximizes (3) subject to the con-
straints (4) for every j.
2. Given {Rt, wt}
T
t=1, the sequence {Kt, Lt}
T
t=1 maximizes the firm’s profit for every t.
3. The capital and labor markets clear in each period. That is,
∑N
j=1 kj,t = Kt, Rt = rt−δ,
and
∑N
j=1 ξj,t = Lt for every t.
2.6 Recursive Formulation In what follows, we impose complete depreciation of cap-
ital (δ = 1). This assumption merely simplifies the language for the present discussion, and
4
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we will see below that we can repeat the same arguments with incomplete depreciation by
reinterpreting the problem in terms of certain effective variables.
Let Ωt denote the fraction of current output invested in period t and let sj,t be household
j’s share of that investment. In the particular case of total depreciation (δ = 1), using
the constancy of factor shares of the Cobb-Douglas production technology we can write
household j’s budget constraint in terms of shares of current output Yt,
cj,t = [(1− α)ej,t + αsj,t−1 − sj,tΩt]Yt 1 ≤ t ≤ T (7)
We denote the jth agent’s initial share of aggregate wealth Y1 by ωj,1:
ωj,1 = (1− α)ej,1 + αsj,0, (8)
where we take ej,1 and sj,0 to be an initial endowment of labor and capital made known prior
to any decision being made.
When T = 1, the solution of the agent’s problem is straightforward. There is no value
gained by saving, so everything is consumed: sj,1 = 0 for every j. Using this fact, when
T = 2, the agent’s problem can be written
max
{ct}Tt=1
(
c1−σ1
1− σ
+ β E
c1−σ2
1− σ
)
subject to c1 = [ωj,1 − sj,1Ω1]Y1, c2 = [(1− α)ej,2 + αsj,1]Y2
Substituting in the constraints, the problem becomes one of choosing the share sj,1 of ag-
gregate investment Ω1Y1 (as ordained by the auctioneer) that the agent will claim. Each
agent will optimally chose his share of aggregate investment. Out of equilibrium, the share
chosen by the agent might be subject to wishful thinking, in that such an agent solving his
problem might come to the conclusion that he would like to hold more of the aggregate than
the auctioneer has made available (sj,1 > 1). However, the auctioneer is bound by market
clearing and such a situation indicates that equilibrium has not been achieved, insofar as the
auctioneer’s problem is not solved.
A solution sj,1 = f2(ωj,1, ej,2, z2,Ω1, Y1) of the above problem indicates a value function
V2(ωj,1; ej,2, z2,Ω1, Y1) =
[(ωj,1 − f2(ωj,1, ej,2, z2,Ω1, Y1)Ω1)Y1]
1−σ
1− σ
+ β E
[(αf2(ωj,1, ej,2, z2,Ω1, Y1) + (1− α)ej,2)Y2]
1−σ
1− σ
Notice that V2 contains a dependence on initial output, the fraction of this output held by
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the agent, the fraction of the aggregate to be invested, and the random variables representing
the future shocks.
When T = 3, then, the agent seeks to maximize
[(ωj,1 − sj,1Ω1)Y1]
1−σ
1− σ
+ β EV2(αsj,1 + (1− α)ej,2; ej,3, z3,Ω2, Y2)
where the second term is the discounted expected future value given by the two period value
function for an agent holding a share of output Y2 as determined by investment returns αsj,1
plus employment earnings (1− α)ej,2 at the start of period 2.
The solution of the above problem now yields a decision rule
sj,1 = f3(ωj,1, {ej,t}
3
t=2, {zt}
3
t=2, {Ωt}
2
t=1, Y1) (9)
and corresponding value function
V3(ωj,1; {ej,t}
3
t=2, {zt}
3
t=2, {Ωt}
2
t=1, Y1). (10)
Inducting on this procedure, in the case of a general (but finite) number of periods T ,
we obtain a value function
VT (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1) = max
s
((ωj,1 − sj,1Ω1)Y1)
1−σ
1− σ
+ β EVT−1[(1− α)ej,2 + αsj,1; {ej,t}
T
t=3, {zt}
T
t=3, {Ωt}
T−1
t=2 , Y2].
(11)
An important simplification occurs in the case of log utility. Namely, the agent’s decisions
are independent of the initial aggregate Y1, so that we may reformulate the problem in such
a way that the value function is also independent of this quantity. This result is reminiscent
of the optimal portfolio literature in which agents with homothetic utility functions choose
an allocation between risky and riskless assets that is independent of wealth level (see ?).
Figure 1 depicts an event-tree view of the aggregate economy, while figure 2 is the coun-
terpart for the typical agent. As noted above and in the figures, variables dated t are chosen
or known within the period. At the beginning of the period the shocks are realized, then
production occurs. The period concludes with the investment-consumption choice.
Finally, we should note that we currently do not have a proof of existence and uniqueness
for the auctioneer’s problem. We submit the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1: For any number N of agents, number m of time periods, distribution of
initial endowment and choice of employment shocks as described above, there exists a unique
6
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Yt
Kt
Ct
zt+1 ξt+1
Yt+1 = zt+1K
α
t L
1−α
t+1
Kt+1
Ct+1
Ωt
1− Ω
t
Ωt+1
1− Ω
t+1
t t+ 1
Figure 1: Aggregate Economy
ωtYt
kt
ct
zt+1 et+1
(αst + (1− α)et+1)Yt
kt+1
ct+1
stΩ
t/ω
t
1− s
tΩ
t/ω
t
st+1Ωt+
1/ωt+1
1− st+1Ωt+1/ωt+1
t t+ 1
Figure 2: Typical Agent’s Problem (ωt = αst + (1− α)et+1)
solution to the auctioneer’s problem.
We unable as yet to resolve the conjecture but are working vigorously on it. What we
present instead is a theorem about the extent to which this model approximately aggregates.
Recall that approximate aggregation is a phenomenon first observed numerically in a very
strong way by Krussel and Smith. What we do here is provide a rigorous justification of
a fairly weak form of aggregation. We have as yet no real progress on obtaining rigorous
existence and uniqueness of solutions to our model, since we can’t solve the auctioneer’s
problem. The reason that we find a rigorous description of approximate aggregation to be
tractable is that it involves only the agent’s problem, which is readily solved and whose
solution is readily analyzed.
3 Restrictions On The Allowed Shocks
3.1 Asymptotic Notation As a number of constants will enter our discussion, we will
omit the constant by making use of asymptotic notation A = O(B). We introduce the
asymptotic notation that if A > cB, we say that A is U(B). (It is an underestimate instead
of an overestimate.)
7
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3.2 Aggregate Shocks The aggregate shocks zt are allowed to be quite general. In
particular, the distribution of the shock in a given period is allowed to depend on the
outcomes in prior periods. However, we do require that the possible values of the aggregate
shock be bounded:
zt = O(1) (12)
with the implicit constant independent of the number of agents N and the distribution of
wealth.
3.3 Employment Shocks We place two restrictions on the employment shock, both of
which are key in obtaining the aggregation result stated in the following section.
We impose the risk of unemployment condition, that the probability that ej,t = 0 is at
least a constant c > 0, also independent of N . Thus we are saying that, for each agent j and
period t,
P (ej,t = 0) = U(1) (13)
In other words, in every period, every agent has a chance of being unemployed. This is
important to ensure that agents must counteract a non-insureable risk of unemployment
through their investment in each period. Specifically, under this condition the asymptote in
the utility function for zero consumption prevents agents from choosing to consume all that
they have in non-terminal periods (under such a decision they face a positive probability
of having nothing to consume next period, which results in a contribution of −∞ to their
discounted expected utility). Likewise, this prevents borrowing against future wages.
The similar future prospects condition requires that the set {1, 2, . . . , N} is subdivided
into a small number s of subsets A1, . . . , As so that for any j, k ∈ Al, for some l, we have that
ej,t and ek,t have the same distribution at each time t. The need for this comes, simply, from
the fact that agents facing a very disimilar prospect of unemployment or underemployment
cannot be guaranteed to invest a similar amount, even in the case that they have the same
current wealth. Such agents can still be aggregated, provided that there are not so many
disimilarities that they overwhelm the estimates.
We conclude this section by providing some basic examples of shocks one might consider.
3.4 Examples Constant Wages and Uniform Employment Suppose that in each
period (1−u)N of the agents are chosen, for employment, and each is paid an equal fraction
1/((1 − u)N) of the available wages. The remaining uN agents go unemployed. Clearly
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there is a risk of unemployment (a fraction uN randomly face unemployment), and there are
similar future prospects (everyone faces the same chance of employment and unemployment,
every period).
Hence we can conclude approximate aggregation in this model via the theorem below.
However, the aggregation is not perfect; even for two periods there now appears an error
term which is of size O(1/N). Notice that this is negligible for the very rich, but is worth
consideration for the very poor.
Krussell-Smith Shocks. Suppose that the technology process follows a Markov chain
with two states, zg > zb (the ‘good’ state and the ‘bad’ state) with transition probabilities
pxy, x, y ∈ {g, b}. Further, as above, agents are either employed (1) or unemployed (0), and
wages are distributed evenly among employed agents. However, in this instance, the chances
of transitioning between the various states of employment differ, and moreover may depend
on the state of the aggregate shock. Specifically, let πss′ee′ denote the joint probability of
transition from state (zs, e) to state (zs′ , e
′). Then the ratio πss′ee′/πss′ is the conditional
probability of of transitioning into employment status e′ from e.
For this stochastic process, there is a risk of unemployment as long as πss′e0 6= 0 for any
s, s′ ∈ {g, b} and e ∈ {0, 1}. Future prospects are also bounded: agents who are initially
employed (A1) may differ in their decisions from those who are initially unemployed (A2)
if the chances of transition between different employment states are very small; however
everyone falls into one of these groups regardless of the size of N .
3.5 Effective Variables and Undepreciated Capital We now return to the re-
cursive formulation (11), which we wrote down in the case of total depreciation of capital.
We wish to be able to generalize this to the case where capital does not depreciate fully.
To this end, we define the effective aggregate Y ′t , the total number of goods available:
Y ′t := Yt +
(1− δ)
α
Ωt−1Yt−1 > Yt. (14)
We also rewrite the labor shock as an effective shock which is measured relative to this
effective aggregate:
e′j,t := ej,t
Yt
Y ′t
< ej,t. (15)
In particular, note that the effective employment shock satisfies both of the conditions of
the previous discussion provided the real shock does. In practice, it can actually become
9
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significantly smaller; the factor used to obtain it from the real shock can be rewritten as
1
1 + (1−δ)
α
Ωt−1Y
1−α
t
. (16)
In the case of total depreciation this is just 1, and we are left with the original real shock.
However, when δ < 1 and α < 1, a sufficiently large aggregate can make this expression
arbitrarily small: an agent is able to consume primarily out of undepreciated capital, and
employment becomes a secondary concern.
In terms of the effective variables, we can now follow the previous procedure to write the
recursive formulation
VT (ω; {e
′
j,t}
T
t=2, {z
′
t}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1) = max
s
((ω − sΩ1)Y1)
1−σ
1− σ
+ β EVT−1[(1− α)e
′
2 + αs; {e
′
j,t}
T
t=3, {z
′
t}
T
t=3, {Ωt}
T−1
t=2 , Y
′
2 ].
(17)
Seeing that the only change is the direct replacement of real variables by effective ones, in
the discussion that follows we will suppress the ′ notation, while simply remembering that
all aggregate and labor variables refer to their effective counterparts.
4 Approximate Aggregation
4.1 Statements of the Main Theorems We now fix the following quantities: the
number of time periods T , the discount factor β, the Cobb-Douglas exponent α. Let N
denote the number of agents, which we think of as being large compared to T . Let {zt, ej,t}
be the aggregate and employment shocks, and let Ωt, t = 1, ..., T − 1 be a sequence of
forecasts given by the auctioneer. Consider the corresponding agent’s problem (for the jth
agent) given by
max
s
((ω − sΩ1)Y1)
1−σ
1− σ
+ β EVT−1[(1− α)e2 + αs; {ej,t}
T
t=3, {zt}
T
t=3, {Ωt}
T−1
t=2 , Y2],
where, as noted at the end of the last section, ej,t and Yt are the effective employment and
total number of goods available, respectively.
It is convenient to analyze to present the aggregation result in terms of the savings
variable, γ = sΩ1/ω, which represents the ratio of the agent’s desired period 1 savings sΩ1Y1
to that agent’s initial wealth ωY1. Thus it is convenient to write the agent’s problem as a
10
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choice over γ,
max
γ
((1− γ)ωY1)
1−σ
1− σ
+ β EVT−1
[
αωγ
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; {ej,t}
T
t=3, {zt}
T
t=3, {Ωt}
T−1
t=2 , Y2
]
. (18)
Notice that a solution of the agent’s problem suggests a decision rule for γ,
γT (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1).
We refer to this decision rule as the savings function.
For a subset B ⊂ {1, ..., N}, we let
Yl,1 =
∑
j∈B
ωj,1Y1.
be the portion of the aggregate wealth held by the agents who are indexed by B. In this
notation, our main theorem can be written as follows.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the sequence of production and employment shocks {zt, ej,t}
satisfy the risk of unemployment, and similar future prospects conditions. Let ǫ > 0. Then
there is a natural number M = O(1/ǫ) such that we can partition {1, ..., N} into subsets
B1, ..., BM with corresponding ratios γ1, ..., γM ∈ (0, 1) such that
|
∑
j∈{1,...,N}
γj,1ωj,1Y1 −
∑
m∈{1,...,M}
γmYm,1| ≤ ǫY1.
To understand the relation of this theorem to aggregation, it is instructive to look at
what occurs if we were able to take M = 1 (this is not possible in practice outside of the
trivial case when ǫ > 1). In that case, the theorem says that if we lump all agents together
into a single entity B1 holding wealth
∑
j∈B1
ωj,1Y1 = Y1 and saving a fraction γ1 of its
wealth, the error between the aggregate investment thus computed and the true aggregate
initial period investment
∑
j γj,1ωj,1Y1 will be at least as small as 2ǫY1. In other words, all
agents combined would save γY1 where γ may change as we alter the distribution of wealth
among agents, but nevertheless will remain in the interval [γ1 − 2ǫ, γ1 + 2ǫ].
For meaningful values of ǫ, the above theorem is slightly weaker: it says that we can
redistribute wealth among agents within any single one of O(1/ǫ) bins without changing the
aggregate substantially. In other words, we have approximate aggregation.
A key feature of the above theorem is that the number of bins is independent of both
the number of agents and the distribution of wealth among those agents. The intuition
which motivates our isolating of N and the distribution as the dependencies of interest is the
11
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potential for using the limit N → ∞ to approximate continuous distribution models such
that outlined in KS. As such, the above aggregation result is constructed to be robust no
matter how large we might take N to be.
The main theorem will follow, by a pigeonholing argument, as a corollary of the following
theorem investigating the behavior of the derivative of the savings function with respect to
agent wealth.
Theorem 2: Suppose that the sequence of production and employment shocks {zt, ej,t}
satisfy the risk of unemployment and similar future prospects conditions. Let γ′T denote the
partial derivative of the function γT with respect to its first variable (the share variable, ω)
and similarly for γ′T−1.
Then γT is increasing and we have a bound on γ
′
T (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1) given
by
O
(
1
ω1−σ
E
[
ej.2
y2j,2
+ y1−σj,2 γ
′
T−1(yj,2; {ej,t}
T
t=3, {zt}
T
t=3, {Ωt}
T−1
t=2 , Y2)
])
.
where the random variable yj,2 is given by αωγT/Ω1 + (1− α)e2.
4.2 Lemmas Regarding Value and Savings Functions The next two sections will
contain the large majority of our technical arguments. For this portion of the discussion we
will simplify the notation in order to focus on the most relevant dependencies of our value
functions and decision rules.
Specifically, we will write
VT (ω; Y1) for VT (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1)
sT (ω; Y1) for fT (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1)
γT (ω; Y1) for γT (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1)
All derivatives will be with respect to the first variable, ω, and will be denoted (respec-
tively) by V ′T (ω; Y1), s
′
T (ω; Y1), and γ
′
T (ω; Y1), with analogous expressions for higher order
derivatives. We assume throughout that the shocks {zt, ej,t} satisfy the conditions laid out
previously.
We further simplify the notation by speaking about the problem faced by a typical agent,
and correspondingly suppressing the subscripts 1 ≤ j ≤ N on employment shocks.
In the following arguments, we will frequently need to refer to the first order condition
12
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for the agent’s problem. For convenience we record it here, once and for all:
Y 1−σ1
(ω − sΩ1)σ
=
βα
Ω1
EV ′T−1((αs+ (1− α)e2); Y2) (19)
and, in terms of the savings variable γ,
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ
(1− γ)σ
=
βαω
Ω1
EV ′T−1
(
αωγ
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
)
. (20)
We begin by demonstrating that the agent’s bounded rationality makes it easy to solve
the agent’s problem.
Lemma 1. There is a unique solution to the agent’s problem. The decision rule is increasing
with respect to ω, and the corresponding value function is strictly increasing and strictly
concave with respect to ω. Moreover
lim
ω→0+
VT (ω; Y1) = −∞ (21)
Proof. When T = 1, this is clear: the decision rule is to consume everything. The value
function is u(ω; Y1), which is clearly increasing and strictly concave as a function of ω, with
the given asymptote.
Let T > 1, and suppose we have a unique solution to the T − 1 period model with a
value function having the stated properties. We need to show that, for a given value of ω,
there is a unique value of s ∈ (0, ω/Ω1) satisfying (19). The left hand side of this equation
is strictly increasing in s from
Y 1−σ
1
ωσ
> 0 to ∞. As s → 0+, the right side approaches ∞,
due to positive probability that e2 = 0 (possibility of unemployment); moreover it is strictly
decreasing by concavity of VT−1. From these facts it is clear that such a value of s must
exist, and moreover must be unique.
That sT is increasing in ω can be seen from an inspection of (19). The fact that VT−1 is
increasing will be apparent from 2 below, and we see that the asymptote is inherited from
VT−1 due to the possibility of unemployment. We must therefore only show that the T period
value function is concave.
In our simplified notation, we have
VT (ω; Y1) =
((ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)Y1)
1−σ
1− σ
+ β EVT−1[((1− α)e2 + αsT (ω; Y1)); Y2].
13
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Differentiating with respect to ω we have
V ′T (ω; Y1) =
Y 1−σ1 (1− s
′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1)
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)σ
+ β Eαs′T (ω; Y1)V
′
T−1[((1− α)e2 + αsT (ω; Y1)); Y2],
and doing so again we have
V ′′T (ω; Y1) =
−σY 1−σ1 (1− s
′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1)
2
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)1+σ
+
Y 1−σ1 (−s
′′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1)
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)σ
+ β E(αs′T (ω; Y1))
2V ′′T−1[((1− α)e2 + αsT (ω; Y1)); Y2]
+ β Eαs′′T (ω; Y1)V
′
T−1[((1− α)e2 + αsT (ω; Y1)); Y2].
Invoking the first order condition, we see that the terms involving s′′T cancel, leaving
V ′′T (ω; Y1) =
−σY 1−σ1 (1− s
′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1)
2
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)1+σ
+ β E(αs′T (ω; Y1))
2V ′′T−1[((1− α)e2 + αsT (ω; Y1)); Y2].
Both remaining terms are negative: this is clear by investigation for the first term, and
follows from concavity of the one-period-less value function in the second. This closes the
induction.
When analyzing the derivative of γT (ω; Y1), we will be forced to confront derivatives
of the value function VT−1(ω; Y1) emergent in the first order conditions. We will need the
formulae
Lemma 2.
V ′T (ω; Y1) =
Y 1−σ1
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)σ
V ′′T (ω; Y1) =
σY 1−σ1 (s
′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1 − 1)
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)1+σ
.
We remark that in the log utility case, the derivatives of the value function become the
limits of the above expressions as σ → 1. This can be seen in an almost identical (albeit
simpler) calculation to the below.
Proof. The value function is what we obtain by substituting the optimal decision rule into
the agent’s discounted expected consumption. Differentiating the resulting function with
14
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respect to ω, we get
V ′T (ω; Y1) =
Y 1−σ1 (1− s
′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1)
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)σ
+ βαs′T (ω; Y1)EY2V
′
T−1(αsT (ω; Y1) + (1− α)e; Y2).
Using the first order condition (19), the terms involving s′T cancel, and we get
V ′T (ω; Y1) =
Y 1−σ1
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)σ
Differentiating the above expression for V ′, we get
V ′′T (ω; Y1) =
σY 1−σ1 (s
′
T (ω; Y1)Ω1 − 1)
(ω − sT (ω; Y1)Ω1)1+σ
.
Next, in order to bound the derivative of γ with respect to ω, we will perform an analysis
which will be aided by our ability to write U(1) and O(1) for expressions dependent on model
parameters, allowing us to focus on the variables of interest. Several of these expressions will
involve factors of γ or 1−γ, and thus we provide the following sequence of technical lemmas,
the net result of which is a statement slightly stronger than the fact that 0 < γT (ω; Y1) < 1.
We begin by observing that an agent who faces guaranteed unemployment will invest
a larger fraction of his income than one who has a potential opportunity to obtain wages.
Hence we can estimate
1− γT (ω; Y1) > 1− γT (ω; Y1)
where γT (ω; Y1) is the savings function corresponding to the agent’s problem with all em-
ployment shocks equal to 0. It will be apparent in the proof below that the right hand
side is independent of ω, as should be expected due to the lack of heterogeneity in the
no-employment extreme case. We can therefore write
1− γT (ω; Y1) > 1− γT ({Yt}
T
t=2, Y1).
Lemma 3. We have
1
1− γ2({Y2}, Y1)
= 1 +
(
βα1−σ E
Y 1−σ2
(Ω1Y1)1−σ
)1/σ
15
Chipeniuk, Katz & Walker: Approximate Aggregation
and, for T > 2, we have the recursive expression
1
1− γT ({Yt}
T
t=2, Y1)
:= 1 +
(
βα1−σ E
Y 1−σ2
(Ω1Y1)1−σ
(
1
(1− γT−1({Yt}
T
t=3, Y2))
σ
))1/σ
. (22)
A remark before the proof: Notice that in the case of log utility, the inequality given by
the lemma reduces to the significantly simpler expression
1− γT =
1
1 + β + ... + βT−1
.
Proof. The proof is just a rewriting of first order conditions. We proceed by induction.
When T = 2, the agent maximizes
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ(1− γ)1−σ
1− σ
+ β E
αω
Ω1
γ1−σY 1−σ2
1− σ
Taking first order conditions with respect to γ results in
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ
(1− γ)σ
= β
(
αω
Ω1
)1−σ
1
γσ
EY 1−σ2 .
After some cancelling the factors involving ω, taking σth roots, and rearranging, this gives
1
1− γ
= 1 +
(
βα1−σ E
Y 1−σ2
(Ω1Y1)1−σ
)1/σ
which is the estimate for T = 2.
The inductive step proceeds similarly. Suppose that we have demonstrated that 1−γT−1
can be expressed as the right hand side of (22). The agent for the T period case solves
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ(1− γ)1−σ
1− σ
+ β EVT−1
(
αωγ
Ω1
; Y2
)
.
Applying Lemma 2, we can write the first order conditions (in terms of γ) as
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ
(1− γ)σ
= β
(
αω
Ω1
)1−σ
1
γσ
E
Y 1−σ2
(1− γT−1({Yt}
T
t=3; Y2))
σ
.
Rearranging, we have
(
γ
1− γ
)σ
= βα1−σ E
(
Y 1−σ2
(Ω1Y1)1−σ
(
1
(1− γT−1({Yt}
T
t=3; Y2))
σ
))
,
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and applying the inductive hypothesis to the latter factor in each term of the expected value
we are done.
A sibling to the above result is the following, which will allow us to write U(1) for
γT (ω, Y1) itself. We write Ee2=0X for the expected value of the random variable X over the
event that e2 = 0. That is,
E
e2=0
X = EX1e2=0
where 1A denotes the characteristic function of the event A.
Lemma 4. Let
1
1− γ
2
({Y2}, Y1)
:= 1 +
(
βα1−σ E
e2=0
Y 1−σ2
(Ω1Y1)1−σ
)1/σ
and for T > 2 let
1
1− γ
T
({Yt}Tt=2, Y1)
:= 1 +
(
βα1−σ E
e2=0
Y 1−σ2
(Ω1Y1)1−σ
(
1
(1− γ
T−1
({Yt}Tt=3, Y2)
σ
))1/σ
(23)
Then
1− γT (ω; Y1) ≤ 1− γT ({Yt}
T
t=2, Y1).
Proof. In the first order condition (20), taking only those terms with e2 = 0 we get
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ
(1− γ)σ
≥
βαω
Ω1
E
e2=0
V ′T−1
(
αωγ
Ω1
; Y2
)
.
Applying Lemma 2 gives
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ
(1− γ)σ
≥ β
(
αω
Ω1
)1−σ
1
γσ
E
e2=0
Y 1−σ2
(1− γT−1(
αωγ
Ω1
; Y2))σ
.
In the case T = 2, γT−1 = γ1 = 0, and we can rearrange this as in the previous lemma.
Inducting, then, and assuming the result for T − 1 periods, we can bound 1 − γT−1 from
above by 1− γ
T−1
giving
Y 1−σ1 ω
1−σ
(1− γ)σ
≥ β
(
αω
Ω1
)1−σ
1
γσ
E
e2=0
Y 1−σ2
(1− γ
T−1
({Yt}Tt=3, Y2))
σ
.
Rearranging the last expression gives the general result.
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In practice, we will not directly apply the above lemmas, but instead refer to the following
bounds, which follow from a rearrangement of terms in the previous two lemmas.
Lemma 5. We have
1− γT (ω, Y1) = U(1)
γT (ω, Y1) = U(1)
where the implicit constants can be made independent of N and ω.
4.3 Derivative of the Savings Function We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Let T ≥ 2 (there is nothing to prove in the T = 1 case). We rearrange (20) as
1
(1− γ)σ
=
βαωσ
Ω1
1
Y 1−σ1
EV ′T−1
(
αωγ
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
)
.
As before, this condition implies a maximizing savings function γT = γT (ω; Y1).
Our first step is to differentiate the last line implicitly with respect to ω. We get
σγ′T
(1− γT )1+σ
=
βασωσ−1
Ω1
1
Y 1−σ1
EV ′T−1
(
αωγT
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
)
+
βαωσ
Ω1
1
Y 1−σ1
[
αγT
Ω1
+
αωγ′T
Ω1
]
EV ′′T−1
(
αωγT
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
)
.
Solving for γ′T , this gives
γ′T (ω) =
βαωσ−1
Ω1
1
Y 1−σ
1
[
E
(
σV ′T−1
(
αωγT
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
)
+ αωγT
Ω1
V ′′T−1
(
αωγT
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
))]
[
σ
(1−γT )1+σ
− βα
2
Ω2
1
ω1+σ 1
Y 1−σ
1
EV ′′T−1
(
αωγT
Ω1
+ (1− α)e2; Y2
)]
(24)
We can simplify the numerator a fair bit. We let x = αωγT
Ω1
and rewrite it as
βα
Ω1ω1−σY
1−σ
1
E
(
σV ′T−1 (x+ (1− α)e2) + xV
′′
T−1 (x+ (1− α)e2)
)
(25)
Introducing a random variable y2 = x + (1 − α)e2 and rewriting a typical term of the last
expression using Lemma 2 gives
βα
Ω1ω1−σY
1−σ
1
[
σY 1−σ2
(x+ (1− α)e2 − sT−1(y2)Ω2)σ
+
σxY 1−σ2 (s
′
T−1(y2)Ω2 − 1)
(x+ (1− α)e2 − sT−1(y2)Ω2)1+σ
]
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with sT−1 being shorthand for the T − 1 period decision rule, sT−1(y2) = sT−1(y2; Y2). This
simplifies further to become
βα
Ω1ω1−σY
1−σ
1
σY 1−σ2
[
(1− α)e2 − sT−1(y2)Ω2 + xs
′
T−1(y2)Ω2
(x+ (1− α)e2 − sT−1(y2)Ω2)1+σ
]
. (26)
To make sense of the expression −sT−1(y2)Ω2 + xs
′
T−1(y2)Ω2, we note that
−sT−1(y2)Ω2 + xs
′
T−1(y2)Ω2 = −sT−1(y2)Ω2 + y2s
′
T−1(y2)Ω2 − (1− α)e2s
′
T−1(y2)Ω2.
However, we also have the definition
γT−1(y2) =
sT−1(y2)Ω2
y2
and so differentiating with respect to y2 we get
γ′T−1(y2) =
s′T−1(y2)Ω2
y2
−
sT−1(y2)Ω2
y22
.
whereby
−sT−1(y2)Ω2 + s
′
T−1(y2)y2Ω2 = y
2
2γ
′
T−1(y2).
and so
−sT−1(y2)Ω2 + xs
′
T−1(y2)Ω2 = y
2
2γ
′
T−1(y2)− (1− α)e2s
′
T−1(y2)Ω2. (27)
Combining equations (26) and (27), we see that (25) is equal to
βασ
Ω1ω1−σY
1−σ
1
E
[
Y 1−σ2
(1− α)e2(1− s
′
T−1(y2)Ω2) + y
2
2γ
′
T−1(y2)
(y2 − sT−1(y2)Ω2)1+σ
]
,
and returning this to (24) we have
γ′T =
βασ
Ω1ω1−σY
1−σ
1
E
[
Y 1−σ2
(1−α)e2(1−s′T−1(y2)Ω2)+y
2
2γ
′
T−1(y2)
(y2−sT−1(y2)Ω2)1+σ
]
[
σ
(1−γT )1+σ
− βα
2
Ω2
1
ω1+σ 1
Y 1−σ
1
EV ′′T−1 (y2; Y2)
]
Concavity of the value function implies that both terms in the denominator of the last
19
Chipeniuk, Katz & Walker: Approximate Aggregation
expression are positive. Estimating their sum by the former term, we get
γ′T ≤
2βα
Ω1ω1−σY
1−σ
1
E
[
Y 1−σ2
(1− α)e2(1− s
′
T−1(y2)Ω2) + y
2
2γ
′
T−1(y2)
y1+σ2 (1− γT−1(y2))
1+σ
]
Concavity of the value function and the fact that sT−1 is increasing implies that
0 < 1− s′T−1(y2)Ω2 < 1
and in particular that 1 − s′T−1(y2)Ω2 = O(1). We therefore see from (4.3) that γ
′
T itself is
positive. Moreover, absorbing factors not dependent on N and ω into a single constant, we
can rewrite the above bound as
γ′T = O
(
1
ω1−σ
E
e2 + y
2
2γ
′
T−1(y2)
y1+σ2
)
where we have used the fact that γT−1 is bounded away from 1 and the fact that aggregate
shocks are bounded.
4.4 Proof of the Main Theorem Equipped with Theorem 2, we may proceed to
establish the approximate aggregation estimates Theorem 1. We wish to group our agents
into bins such that any two agents within a single bin have approximately the same value
of γT (ω; {ej,t}
T
t=2, {zt}
T
t=2, {Ωt}
T−1
t=1 , Y1). For the current discussion, we further simplify our
notation to read γT (ω) := γT (ω, Y1).
Fix the number of time periods T and the error parameter ǫ > 0. The case in which any
agent has all the wealth is trivial, so we may suppose not. We begin by using the similar
future prospects condition on the employment shocks to separate the agents into sets indexed
by A1, ..., As ⊂ {1, ..., N} so that for j, k ∈ Al we have that the distributions of ej,t and ek,t
are the same in each time period.
Next, for a fixed choice of the set Al, we estimate the total variation of γT as ω ranges
across the interval [0, 1].
4.4.1 Variation of the Savings Function We proceed by induction. When T = 2,
γT−1 = γ1 ≡ 0. Using this in our bound we get
γ′2 = O
(
1
ω1−σ
E
e2
y1+σ2
)
.
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Integrating this bound over shares in [0, 1], we can bound the total variation of γ2 over this
interval by
∫ 1
0
γ′2(ω) dω = O
(
E
∫ 1
0
e2
ω1−σy1+σ2
)
dω
= O
(
E
[∫ e2
0
e2
ω1−σy1+σ2
dω +
∫ 1
e2
e2
ω1−σy1+σ2
dω
])
.
In the first term under the expected value, we bound y2 = U(e2), and so the contribution
is ∫ e2
0
e2
ω1−σy1+σ2
dω = O
(
1
eσ2
∫ e2
0
1
ω1−σ
)
= O
(
1
eσ2
eσ2
)
= O(1).
In the second term under the expected value, we instead bound y2 = U(ω), giving
∫ 1
e2
e2
ω1−σy1+σ2
dω = O
(
e2
∫ 1
e2
1
ω2
dω
)
= O
(
e2
(
1
e2
− 1
))
= O(1).
Combining the last three calculations we get
∫ 1
0
γ′2(ω) dω = O(1)
as desired. This concludes the T = 2 case.
Let T > 2, and suppose that the total variation bound has been established for T − 1.
We now have
∫ 1
0
γ′T (ω) dω = O
(
E
∫ 1
0
(
e2
ω1−σy1+σ2
+
y1−σ2 γ
′
T−1(y2)
ω1−σ
)
dω
)
.
The first term under the integral is identical to the expression bounded in the T = 2 case, and
we need only use the inductive hypothesis to bound the second term. Doing so requires that
we have an estimate ωγ′T−1(ω) = O(1). This is accomplished by yet another straightforward
induction, which we now pause to establish.
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We have
ωγ′2(ω) = O
(
E
e2ω
σ
y1+σ2
)
= O
(
E
e2ω
σ
(ω + e2)1+σ
)
= O(1)
using the simple bound e2ω
σ < (ω+ e2)
1+σ. Proceeding inductively, assuming the bound for
ωγ′T−2(ω), we have
ωγ′T−1(ω) = O
(
E
[
e2ω
σ
y1+σ2
+ ωσy1−σ2 γ
′
T−2(y2)
])
= O
(
E
[
1 +
ωσ
yσ2
])
= O(1)
where in the second line we used the induction to bound y1+σ2 γ
′
T−2(y2).
Now, on the range [0, e2], we apply the above argument and bound y2 as having size of
order e2, giving
∫ e2
0
y1−σ2 γ
′
T−1(y2)
ω1−σ
dω = O
(
e−σ2
∫ e2
0
1
ω1−σ
dω
)
= O (1) (28)
On the range [e2, 1], we bound y2 as having size of order ω, giving
∫ 1
e2
y1−σ2 γ
′
T−1(y2)
ω1−σ
dω = O
(∫ 1
e2
γ′T−1(y2) dω
)
Since we have a U(1) bound on γT and since γT is increasing, we also have a U(1) bound
on the derivative of y2 with respect to ω, which is given by
α
Ω1
(γT + ωγ
′
T ). We can therefore
change variables in the right hand side of the last line to get
∫ 1
e2
y1−σ2 γ
′
T−1(y2)
ω1−σ
dω = O
(∫ 1
e2
γ′T−1(y2) dy2
)
= O(1)
by the inductive hypothesis.
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Combining the above calculations we see that
∫ 1
0
y1−σ2 γ
′
T−1(y2)
ω1−σ
dω = O (1)
and consequently that
∫ 1
0
γ′T (ω) dω = O(1)
as desired.
4.5 Binning The previous calculations show that, for a fixed choice of Al (and hence
the distributions of employment shocks), γ′T changes by at most O(1) as ω ranges across
the interval [0, 1]. We can therefore subdivide [0, 1] into subintervals Im,l = [am,l, bm,l),
m = 1, ...,M such that
M = O(1/ǫ)
For each l, for ωj1, ωj2 ∈ Im,l we have |γT (ωj1)− γT (ωj2)| ≤ ǫ.
where M does not depend on N or the distribution of wealth. Referencing now the wealth
of the jth agent as ωj , we set
Bm,l = {j ∈ {1, ..., N} ∩ Al : ωj ∈ Im,l}
γm,l = γT (am,l)
Ym,l =
∑
j∈Bm,l
ωjY1.
Given these definitions, we have
|
∑
j∈Bm,l
γT (ωj)ωjY1 − γm,lYm,l| = |
∑
j∈Bm,l
(γT (ωj)− γm,l)ωjY1|
≤
∑
j∈Bm,l
|γT (ωj)− γm,l|ωjY1
≤ ǫYm,l.
Summing over m = 1, ...,M and l, we get
|
∑
j∈{1,...,N}
γT (ωj)ωjY1 −
M∑
m=1
∑
l
γm,lYm,l| ≤ ǫ
M∑
m=1
∑
l
Ym,l ≤ ǫY1. (29)
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This is the estimate of the theorem. Moreover, the number of groupings of agents is at most
sM = O(1/ǫ) as desired.
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